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Abstract— Transportation safety, one of the main driving
forces of the development of vehicular communication (VC)
systems, relies on high-rate safety messaging (beaconing). At
the same time, there is consensus among authorities, industry,
and academia on the need to secure VC systems. With specific
proposals in the literature, a critical question must be answered:
can secure VC systems be practical and satisfy the requirements
of safety applications, in spite of the significant communication
and processing overhead and other restrictions security and
privacy-enhancing mechanisms impose? To answer this question,
we investigate in this paper the following three dimensions for
secure and privacy-enhancing VC schemes: the reliability of
communication, the processing overhead at each node, and the
impact on a safety application. The results indicate that with the
appropriate system design, including sufficiently high processing
power, applications enabled by secure VC can be in practice as
effective as those enabled by unsecured VC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular communication (VC) systems are developed as
a means to enhance transportation safety and efficiency. Ve-
hicles and road-side infrastructure units (RSUs) are equipped
with on-board sensors, computers, and wireless transceivers.
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communication enable primarily safety applications. Many
research and development projects, including the Car-to-Car
Communication Consortium in Europe and the US Department
of Transportation VII initiative, converge towards a design
with vehicles frequently beaconing their position along with
warnings on their condition or the environment. Typical bea-
coning periods considered are in the order of one beacon per
100 milliseconds per vehicle.
At the same time, it has been understood that VC systems
are vulnerable to attacks and that the privacy of their users is
at stake. For example, an attacker could inject messages with
false information, or collect vehicle messages to track their
locations and infer sensitive user data. As a result, the research
community in industry and academia, with the endorsement
of authorities, has undertaken three major efforts to design
security and privacy enhancing solutions for VC: the NoW
project [8], the IEEE 1609.2 working group [9], and the
SeVeCom project [11].
A few basic ideas transcend all these efforts to develop VC
security architectures. They all build on top of a currently
well-understood vehicular communication protocol stack that
includes safety beaconing. Moreover, they all utilize a Certifi-
cation Authority (CA) and public key cryptography to protect
V2V and V2I messages. Their primary requirements are
message authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, as well
as protection of private user information. To address those
apparently contradictory goals, they all rely on the concept of
pseudonymity or pseudonymous authentication [8], [9], [11]:
they require that (i) each vehicle (node) is equipped with
multiple certified public keys (pseudonyms) that do not reveal
the node identity, and (ii) the vehicle uses them alternately,
each for a short period of time, so that messages signed under
different pseudonyms cannot be linked.
It is becoming clear that the security overhead of such
systems will be significant; for example, each safety beacon
has to be signed, and each vehicle has to validate every 100
milliseconds beacons from several dozens of vehicles within
range. Which, not to forget, may essentially change their
identity (pseudonym) at any point in time, thus making it
harder for their neighboring vehicles to validate their signed
beacons.
The immediate question, for designers and users of vehic-
ular communication systems alike, arises: What is the effect
of security and notably these broadly accepted pseudonym-
based mechanisms on safety applications? In plain terms,
can, for example, vehicle collisions still be avoided when an
emergency braking situation arises?
There has been a timid approach to answer this question in
our earlier work [5], whose main contribution was the sim-
plification of key (pseudonym) management while satisfying
privacy and security requirements. But, in terms of evaluating
the impact of security on the VC system effectiveness, we
analyzed only a simple transportation scenario: the distance
at which a fast-approaching vehicle receives an emergency
braking signal from a vehicle ahead.
In this paper, we extend the work in [5] to investigate the
impact of security on transportation safety. First, we consider
more realistic and complex scenarios, in particular, a platoon
of one hundred cars. We develop a simulation environment
and provide an evaluation that takes into consideration factors
critical for vehicle safety. Primarily, the probability of (safety)
message reception, especially as the channel load may change,
and the processing load. We study the impact of an emergency
situation throughout the platoon: we measure the occurrences
of vehicle collisions for different environments and different
security and privacy protection schemes, and compare against
the effectiveness of a basic “no security” safety beaconing
scheme. We emphasize that our objective here is not to propose
new security and privacy enhancing schemes. Rather, we
evaluate the state-of-the-art approaches and seek to identify
if and how they can be practical, satisfying the requirements
of safety applications.
In the rest of the paper, Sec. II outlines the secure commu-
nication schemes we consider in our evaluation. We present
the simulation setup for our analysis in Sec. III. Our results,
for each of the considered schemes, follow, on three fronts: (i)
the reliability of communication (Sec. IV), (ii) the processing
load at each node (Sec. V), and (iii) the overall impact on the
transportation safety, expressed as the proportion of collided
vehicles, under various conditions (Sec. VI). Even under
high-stress network scenarios, our findings are encouraging:
with appropriate system design, the achieved safety levels for
secure and privacy-enhancing VC systems can be practically
indistinguishable from those achieved without security.
II. SECURE AND PRIVACY-ENHANCING VEHICULAR
COMMUNICATION
A. Baseline Pseudonyms (BP)
Following the notation in [5], each vehicle (node) V has
a set of pseudonyms, i.e., public keys certified by the CA
without any information that identifies V . If KiV is V ’s i-
th pseudonym, the certificate CertCA(KiV ) is simply the
CA signature on KiV . The node uses the private key kiV
corresponding to the pseudonym KiV to sign messages. The
signer’s pseudonym and certificate are attached in each mes-
sage, with σki
V
(m) the signature on message m under KiV .
Each pseudonym is used at most for a period of τ seconds and
it is then discarded. When a signed message is received, nodes
validate, with the public key of the CA, CertCA(KiV ), and
then σki
V
(m). These signatures are commonly understood to
be generated with the help of an Elliptic Curve cryptosystem,
such one of the EC-DSA schemes standardized in [2].
B. Hybrid Scheme
The Hybrid scheme, proposed in [5], is essentially a
pseudonymous authentication scheme that enables nodes to
generate their own certified pseudonyms. The only aspect of
BP that Hybrid changes is the computation of pseudonym and
its certificate and, consequently, their validation. To maintain
the degree of privacy protection pseudonymous authentication
provides, nodes utilize a group signature (GS) scheme [4] to
generate their own certificates.
In brief, a GS scheme requires that each node V is equipped
with a secret group signing key gskV and that it belongs to a
group G, with members all vehicles registered with the CA.
A group signature ΣCA,V generated by a group member can
be validated with the use of the group public key gpkCA. The
essence of a GS scheme is that any V can sign a message on
behalf of the group, but the identity of V is never revealed
to any signature verifier and no two signatures of a legitimate
group member can be linked.
The GS scheme allows each node V in G to first generate
its own set of pseudonyms {KiV } (and their corresponding
private keys kiV ) for a “classic” cryptosystem such as EC-
DSA. Then, V generates a group signature ΣCA,V () on each
pseudonym KiV . What V does is to “self-certify” KiV by
producing CertHCA(KiV ); H denotes the hybrid scheme, to
differentiate this from the certificate of the BP approach, and
CA indicates that the certificate was generated by a legitimate
node registered with the CA (the group G).
When a Hybrid-signed message is received, the group
signature ΣCA,V (KiV ) is first validated. According to the GS
scheme properties, the verifier of the certificate cannot identify
V and cannot link this certificate and pseudonym to any prior
pseudonym used by V . Once the certificate is validated, the
“classic” signature σki
V
(m) identical to that of the BP scheme
is validated. For further details, omitted here due to space
limitations, we refer to [5] and references within.
C. Optimizations
We consider the three optimizations devised in [5], but
when applicable (for Optimizations 2 and 3 and Optimization
1 at the verifier’s side) we do so for any pseudonymous
authentication scheme, rather than the Hybrid scheme only.
When the optimizations are applicable for both the BP and
Hybrid schemes, we simplify the notation for the certificates
to Cert(KiV ), not distinguishing which method is used for the
certificate generation.
Optimization 1: At the sender side, the certificate
CertHCA(K
i
V ) for a pseudonym KiV is computed only once, as
CertHCA(K
i
V ) remains unchanged throughout the pseudonym
lifetime τ . Similarly, at the verifier, Cert(KiV ) is validated
(and stored) only when it is first received, although the
same signer will append it to multiple subsequent messages.
Optimization 1 is effective as the beaconing rate γ is such
that τ >> γ−1.
Optimization 2: The sender appends its signature
σki
V
(m) to all messages, but it appends it along with the cor-
responding KiV , Cert(KiV ) once every α messages (beacons).
We denote such a message as LONG. For the remaining
α − 1 messages, V appends only σki
V
(m) to the message
payload. We denote such messages as SHORT . We term
α the Certificate Period. Once a new pseudonym must be
used (e.g., upon expiration of the one currently in use by V ),
σki+1
V
(m),Ki+1V , Cert(K
i+1
V ) is transmitted.
Optimization 3: As Optimization 2 can harm the protocol
robustness,1 the transmission of Ki+1V , Cert(K
i+1
V ) can be
repeated for β consecutive messages after the pseudonym
change, with β termed the Push Period.
1If the message with Ki+1
V
, Cert(Ki+1
V
) is lost due to wireless channel
impairments, nodes in range of V will be able to validate any signed safety
messages only α (or more) messages after the lost pseudonym/certifcate
transmission.
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III. SIMULATION SETUP
Our simulator, custom-built in C and partly relying on ns-
2, implements the Dedicated Short Range Communications
(DSRC) data link [1], with vehicles transmitting beacons on
a common channel at a rate γ = 10 beacons/sec, a value
considered mandatory for safety applications. Vehicles include
their direction and location but are not further concerned with
the content of messages m whose payload is set to 200 bytes.
Table II provides the cryptographic communication overhead
per message. We implement the physical layer and a realistic
radio propagation model [10], as in [6], [12], with an intended
(nominal) transmission range of d = 200 meters [1], [13].
We simulate scenarios of four- and eight-lane highways,2
with vehicles moving in two opposing two- and four-lane
flows. Along each lane, vehicles are randomly placed with an
average spacing of s meters between two vehicles, and their
velocity is randomly drawn with an average v. The average
spacing value is one vehicle every s = 20 meters per lane,
and the average vehicle velocity is v = 80km/h. Vehicles
process messages from vehicles with the same heading within
a δ > 0. We model wet road conditions by setting the vehicle
braking capabilities to 4 m/s2, which correspond to a friction
coefficient µk = 0.41.
We consider an “emergency braking alarm” application,
with such messages transmitted independently of the beacon-
ing pattern. We investigate how many vehicle collisions occur
when safety messaging is used with and without security. We
focus on a platoon of one hundred cars, denoted as V1 to
V100, along a single lane, with V1 at the head and V100 at
the queue of the platoon. The leading vehicle V1 makes an
emergency brake and starts sending warning messages. Once
some Vi, with i > 1 receives the warning, it warns its driver
and starts sending warnings itself. As proposed in [3], [7],
[14], when Vi receives a warning from a Vj with j > i, it
stops transmitting warnings. This approach assumes that at
least one vehicle behind Vi has already been warned, thus
Vj is in a better position to keep warning Vk, for k > j.
We assume that all braking actions here are (and reported as)
emergency braking.
Braking has two effects: (i) it turns on the vehicle rear
red lights that warn visually vehicles within range (and line)
of sight (expressed in meters, depending on the simulated
weather conditions), and (ii) it triggers the transmission of own
warning messages. Besides warning other vehicles, a warned
Vi clearly warns its driver who starts braking shortly after.
Driver reactions, modeled as a random reaction delay between
0.75 and 1.5 seconds, are triggered by both VC-enabled and
visual (red light) warnings.
These simulated conditions are particularly challenging,
with high vehicle density and average velocities that are
high for the given average vehicle spacing. High vehicle
density results in high network load, especially given the high
beaconing rates, and thus increased packet loss rates. We do
2We also conducted experiments with a six-lane highway omitted here due
to space limitations.
not consider any optimization to reduce processing overhead
(e.g., based on the message content or by having vehicles
adapt their beaconing rates), beyond considering messages
from vehicles with the same heading. This is reasonable for
shoulder-separated highways, but it hard to achieve in an urban
or rural setting. In the latter case, of course, it would be
unrealistic to consider densities of, for example, an average
160 vehicles within a vehicles’s nominal range, which could
be the case in an eight-lane highway with an average vehicle
spacing per lane of 20 meters. Finally, we remark that we
do not simulate lane-changing as a means to avoid collisions,
but leave it as an item for future work. Depending on road
conditions (e.g., in low vehicle density) lane changing may
lead to fewer collisions, but it could have the same effect
across all scenarios (with or without security).
We choose pseudonym lifetime τ = 60 sec. We consider
the first 60 sec of the simulated time as a warm-up period,
during which no emergency conditions arise. By the end of
the warm up period, this allows for one pseudonym change
and discovery of neighbors by validating their corresponding
certificates. This is a realistic situation: at any point in time,
thus when an emergency arises, vehicles have already discov-
ered some of their neighbors and can immediately validate
their warnings. The simulation concludes when all vehicles in
the platoon are immobile;, as V1 does not resume any motion
after its emergency braking.
IV. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Our results are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively: the
y axis is the probability of successful reception of a packet,
as a function of the distance between the packet sender and
receiver (the x-axis). We emphasize that although the message
processing load may be trimmed down, e.g., by using the node
mobility dynamics, this is not the case for the channel load:
any transmission ’contributes’ interference and increases the
likelihood of packet collisions.
This is why the probability of message reception is overall
lower in Fig. 2 than in Fig. 1. The increase from four to
eight lanes essentially doubles vehicle density and network
load. Looking at each plot individually, safety messaging with
“No Security” achieves the highest reliability consistently as
the distance changes. In contrast, the BP or Hybrid with
α = 1 achieves the lowest reliability. This due to transmission
overhead: “No Security” means a constant packet size of 200
bytes, while each of the different α settings corresponds to
different, higher per-packet overhead, as shown in Table I.
Thanks to Optimization 2, communication reliability improves
as α increases, but more so for Hybrid whose certificates are
larger. The average communication overhead due to cryptog-
raphy is calculated in Table I for the Hybrid and BP schemes,
as a function of α. “Pushing” the Optimization 2 beyond a
certain point does not significantly improve reliability further.
V. PROCESSING OVERHEAD
We measure the number of packets that a given receiver, R,
must process per time unit. The processing overhead depends
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Fig. 1. Probability of Successful Packet Reception; Highway Scenario,
Baseline Pseudonym scheme (BP), 8 lanes.
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Fig. 2. Probability of Successful Packet Reception; Highway Scenario,
Hybrid scheme, 8 lanes.
on the rate of messaging received at R, and then the employed
security scheme that specifies at what rate (in fact, how many
or those received) must be processed. For simplicity, we
consider as time unit one beacon period, i.e., γ−1 seconds,
which we refer to as one slot. On-board hardware platforms
that will be used for commercial deployment of vehicular
communication systems are not known and neither is their
expected processing power. This is why we refrain from
attempting to answer if R would be able to process all the
messages it should. Instead, we measure the rate of messages
R should process.
Then, only as a reference, we consider platforms with capa-
bilities close to those used as reference in [5]. We summarize
the per-message costs in Table II, and the resultant maximum
α 1 5 10 15 30 50
BP 341 266 257 254 251 250
Hybrid 502 299 273 265 257 253
TABLE I
AVERAGE PACKET SIZE, INCLUDING OVERHEAD, IN BYTES, FOR BP AND
HYBRID AND DIFFERENT α VALUES.
Sign (ms) Verify (ms) Overhead (bytes)
BP LONG 1.3 7.2 141
Hybrid LONG 54.2 52.3 302
SHORT 0.5 3 48
TABLE II
PROCESSING COSTS AND OVERHEAD FOR DIFFERENT PACKET TYPES,
GIVEN THE BENCHMARKS IN [5].
number of messages that could then be processed in one slot
in Table III, assuming all messages are of the same type and
the node performs no other proessing. Only verifications are
considered because they are dominant factor of cryptographic
processing overhead. With n relevant senders within range, R
would receive and process roughly n messages per slot, versus
one signature generation. The security schemes in Sec. II
involve two types of messages, one carrying a signature only,
termed the SHORT , and one carrying the signature and
the pseudonym and the certificate of the signer, termed the
LONG message. One LONG message is transmitted every
α SHORT messages, and β consecutive LONG messages
are transmitted upon a pseudonym change.
Considering that these are all safety messages, R must in
principle process all of them. Those are, as explained above,
roughly the messages originating from the n vehicles traveling
in the same direction as R. This arrival rate of messages at R
depends on the number of relevant neighbors n, at any given
time t, the message generation rate γ, the type of messages
generated, and the radio propagation.
The node is able to process all the messages received
within the slot, as the safety application mandates, if the total
processing time is less than the slot duration: if
∑n
i=0 ti <
γ−1, where ti is the time needed to process the i-th message.
The rate µ at which messages should be processed byR should
basically equal that of relevant arriving messages, minus some
messages that the Optimizations allow avoiding to process. Not
all received LONG messages from a given sender Vi must
be processed; the first one for each Vi suffices to validate
the pseudonym in use. Conversely, SHORT messages from
Packets per beacon period (slot) of γ−1 sec
BP LONG 13.9
Hybrid LONG 1.9
SHORT 33.3
TABLE III
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PACKETS PER TIME SLOT THAT CAN BE VERIFIED.
4
α LONG SHORT
Received Processed Received Processed
µR σR µP σP µR σR µP σP
1 22.73 2.69 0.07 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 5.40 1.52 0.07 0.26 20.46 2.40 20.44 2.40
10 2.94 1.32 0.07 0.26 23.56 2.55 23.54 2.57
15 2.06 1.37 0.07 0.25 24.66 2.61 24.66 2.61
30 1.16 1.10 0.07 0.25 25.77 2.60 25.77 2.60
50 0.83 0.87 0.07 0.26 26.07 2.72 26.03 2.72
TABLE IV
PACKET RECEPTION AND PROCESSING STATISTICS FOR A SCENARIO OF 4
LANES OF VEHICLES AND OPTIMIZATION 3 IN USE - MEASURED RESULTS
FOR HYBRID.
a non-yet-validated Vi do not have to be processed.
We perform a series of simulations for the Hybrid scheme
for which the packet reception probability was determined
in Sec. IV. We performed the same experiments for the BP
scheme, but we omit those results due to space limitations and
because the difference between LONG and SHORT packets
are more pronounced for the Hybrid. Table IV provides the
results for a scenario with four lanes of traffic and 80 vehicles
on the average, with the messages originating from roughly
40 of them being of interest to R. Table V corresponds to
the case of 8 lanes of traffic and 160 vehicles on the average
within range of R (similarly, with approximately 80 of them
generating messages that would be processed by R). The
measured numbers in both tables, obtained when β = 5
for both settings, are the means and standard deviations of
received packets per slot, µR and σR respectively, and the
means and standard deviations of processed packets per slot,
µP and σP respectively. The results are shown in these tables
for SHORT and LONG packets separately, as a function of
α.
Note that since there is no specific processing power for R,
the measured statistics for processed messages are both the
values for the rates that would need to (and are then trivially
in this case) achieved by R. For α = 1, all traffic is composed
solely of LONG packets, but clearly this is not an advisable
setting neither for the BP nor the Hybrid scheme, as the results
in Secs. IV and VI show. As a side-note, given the processing
capabilities in Table III, we can deduce that a GS scheme
[5] would not be workable for the considered platform, as all
received LONG messages (in fact, at a somewhat higher rate
than that measured in our tables here, as a GS alone results
in lower overhead) would need to be processed at R.
Returning to the Hybrid scheme, only one LONG message
per τ , the pseudonym lifetime, and per vehicle (sender) must
be processed.3 This overhead can be easily undertaken, as
validation of processed LONG messages (e.g., 0.14 per slot)
would require approximately 8% of the processing resources
reported in Table III. The high cost for a single Hybrid LONG
message is amortized.
It is interesting however that the SHORT message pro-
3The same is true for BP with Optimizations.
α LONG SHORT
Received Processed Received Processed
µR σR µP σP µR σR µP σP
1 25.67 3.30 0.14 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 7.52 2.69 0.13 0.34 28.63 3.97 28.56 3.97
10 4.24 1.95 0.13 0.36 33.70 3.74 33.56 3.71
15 2.97 1.32 0.13 0.36 35.36 3.74 34.99 3.72
30 1.68 1.23 0.14 0.35 37.62 3.80 37.33 3.74
50 1.20 1.06 0.13 0.36 38.37 4.15 37.87 4.06
TABLE V
PACKET RECEPTION AND PROCESSING STATISTICS FOR A SCENARIO OF 8
LANES OF VEHICLES AND OPTIMIZATION 3 IN USE - MEASURED RESULTS
FOR HYBRID.
cessing becomes a dominant load factor. In Table IV, µP
could be supported by the considered platform, but it would
consume 78% of its available power. If we consider the highest
measured mean plus three times the standard deviation, the
resultant SHORT processed rate combined with a similar
estimate of the worst-case LONG rate could not be sustained;
there would be slots in which arrivals exceed R’s processing
capability. This is certainly so for the 8-lane scenario, as shown
in Table V: only SHORT messages exceed the 33.3 maxi-
mum achievable processing rate (Table III). These observations
call for action on two fronts, (i) an increase of the processing
power and (ii) the design of a set of optimizations in order to
avoid processing all the packets arriving at R.
VI. TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
We simulate the impact of safety messaging without se-
curity, denoted as “No Security”, versus that of the security
protocols without Optimization 3, i.e., β = 0, and that of
the protocols with Optimization 3 enabled with a β = 5.
We assume that all vehicles can process all messages needed
within a slot (with increased processing power, as explained
in Sec. V). Figs. 3, 4 plot the percentage of crashed platoon
vehicles as a function of α.
At first, we observe that safety messaging reduces crashes
to around 10% of the platoon vehicles, while in the absence
of vehicle communications, for exactly the same scenarios,
80%-100% of the vehicles crash (not shown in the figures).
Recall that the simulated scenarios are challenging (e.g., dense
placement of fast-moving vehicles). “No Security” safety
messaging (which reduces crashes up to 90% with respect to
no V2V) achieves the lowest percentage of crashes and is used
as a benchmark; α is not a relevant parameter and curves in
Figs. 3, 4 are flat with minor variability due to the randomly
seeded simulations.
“No Security” safety messaging is the most effective due to
the lowest network overhead and no restrictions on which alert
message can be validated. In contrast, the tuning of the secure
VC protocols affects the effectiveness of the safety application.
In Figs. 3, 4, we observe at first fewer crashes as α increases,
but then a slight increase in crashes for high α values. On the
one hand, the increase of α reduces the channel load and thus
increases the per-packet reception probability. On the other
5
hand, when α takes high values, the authentication delay for a
receiver missing a LONG message increases: for example, for
α = 50 the authentication delay after the loss of one LONG
message is at least 5 seconds.
Optimization 3 reduces crashes for a given α compared to
the non-optimized protocol (β = 0), adding low overhead but
also significantly reducing authentication delays and averting
situations that would otherwise lead to crashes. Figs. 3, 4
show that β = 5 yields an improvement exactly for high
α values. From a different point of view, Optimization 3
brings the effectiveness of the application close to that of “No
Security”. Overall, the investigated safety application on top
of the Hybrid, with appropriate tuning, is equally effective to
that on top of the BP.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
9.5
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
14.5
Certificate period (msg)
Cr
as
h 
av
er
ag
e 
(%
)
 
 
No Security
β=0
β=5
Fig. 3. Collisions in a Platoon of 100 Cars; 8-lane Highway Scenario,
Baseline Pseudonym Scheme
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
9.5
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
14.5
Certificate period (msg)
Cr
as
h 
av
er
ag
e 
(%
)
 
 
No Security
β=0
β=5
Fig. 4. Collisions in a Platoon of 100 Cars; 8-lane Highway Scenario, Hybrid
Scheme
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed through simulations the cost and impact on
transportation safety that security and privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies in the literature have. We obtained packet reception
probability curves for each security scheme, measured the rates
of packets each node must process, and developed a simulation
environment that adapts vehicle mobility according to received
safety application messages to analyze the safety messaging
and security impact on transportation safety.
We found that current security protocols push on-board
processors considered nowadays to their limits, or above them,
calling for either a redesign of the VC protocols or increased
on-board processing power. If the latter is available, secure
VC schemes can enable safety levels for an emergency braking
application nearly identical to those achieved without security.
Beyond these encouraging results, further analysis and charac-
terization of the processing overhead at each node, along with
investigations of alternative communication protocols, as well
as field experimentation are needed as future work.
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